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KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT

Heather M. Kendrick
Earlham College
Immanuel Kant's position on free will is creative but contro
versiaL It gives empirical science its due by asserting that everything
in nature is bound by the law of causation - thus, it posits determin
ism; yet it also allows us to think of ourselves as moral agents, capable
of acting autonomously - thus, it also posits freedom. It allows us
the best of both worlds; however, it poses many difficult problems.
The idea of an agent outside space and time - a noumenal agent
is an element that can be particularly difficult to tangle with. Just
how does the noumenal agent work outside - or within - the law
of causation? How does the noumenal agent relate to the phenom
enal being? These questions must be dealt with in order to assess the
viability of Kant's doctrine.
According to Kant, we can be both free and causally deter
mined. He esc apes contradiction by saying tha t we are not free in the
same sense in which we are determined; we are transcendentally
free, and empirically determined:
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natural necessity is referred

merely to appearances and freedom merely to things in themselves"
\nQ!S:gQw~

343-44). As rational beings, we have a sensible char

acter that is determined by the laws of causation, but we also have an
intelligible character underlying it, which Kant says is a thing in
itself, a noumenon \-,=~~~B 569). Things in themselves are not in
time, since time is just our own form of sensible intuition; thus, they
cannot be bound in the chain of causal events, which always occur in
time.
Kendrick is a senior philosophy major at Earlham College. She plans
school in tIle fall of 1996.
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One peril of this position (as suggested, in conversation, by
Len Clark) is that if one isn't careful, one might begin talking about
our phenomenal versus noumenal selves. It is easy shorthand, butis
dangerous, because to talk of two selves smacks of Cartesian dual
ism. It leads to the obvious objection that Kant's rational being is not
a unified subject, but is really two separate entities altogether. This
is bad exegesis as well as bad metaphysics. First, Kant certainly
didn't intend to posit two separate selves in this manner. The
rational being is a unified subject that "can be regarded from two
points of view" (Critique B 566). There is a sense in which we are
phenomena, belonging to the wodd of appearance, and a sense in
which we are noumena, belonging to the world of things in them
selves. Second, to misinterpret Kant this way opens him to unde
served criticism over the supposed lack of unity inhis view of the self.
Allen W. Wood suggests that this "two-worlds" view does not allow
us to think of ourselves as unified (Wood 75). He notes tha t "Norman
Kretzmann has commented ... that this may be likened to saying lha t
a married couple is compatible, but only as long as they live in
separate houses" (Wood 75). When looked at in this way, it seems as
though Kant is cheating, but I disagree with Wood and Kretzmunll.
Kant wants to say that our phenomenal and noumenal characters
belong to different worlds (which are really not so much different
worlds as different ways of regarding the world), but are indeed
unified. They are not two entities linked by some mystical silver
cord; they are two aspects of the same entity, two ways of regarding
the subject.
I refer throughout this essay to the intelligible character of
which Kant speaks as the "noumenal agent." This language is not
Kant's. However, I think it is justifiable. Kant does refer to the
intelligible character as a nomnenon (469). And it is this intelligible
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character which can be considered free in action. Kant refers to it as
the intelligible aspect of an "acting subject" (Critique B 567). There
fore, it is fair to call it an agent. Keep in mind, however, that I mean

lithe aspect of an agent which is noumenal." I don't mean that all
people are made up of two agents, a noumenal and a phenomenal
agent. For this would be like the dualism which I rejected earlier.
What is it, then, about this subject that permits it to be free
even though causation is necessary and universal? Causation is
always in time, according to the Second Analogy. But our intelligible
character is not in time, since time is a form of our sensible intuition.
Therefore, our intelligible cilaracter stands apart from the chain of
causation that determines our sensible character; in the respect that
we are intelligible, we are free.
But what does the intelligible character have freedom to do?
If the noumenal aspect of the self can only be free in the noumenal
world, completely apart from anything that happens to the phenom
enal aspect, then wha L is the point of discussing it at all? Ifthere were
no interaction betwp-en the noumenal agent and the phenomenal
world, then we could not describe any of our phenomenal actions as
free. Since the phenomenal world is the world in which we live, it is
there that we want to be able to talk of our actions as being free. Thus,
we must say that somehow our noumenal freedom is expressed in
the phenomenal world.
In fact, that is what Kant says.

writes, lithe active being

[i.e. the noumenal agent] of itself begins its effects in the sensible
world" (Critique B 569). There is an interaction, although the exact
mechanics of this are obscure -

as is reasonable, since we are

discussing noumena, about which we have to be very careful what
we say.
Time is an a priori form of all our sensible intuition. It
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applies, therefore, only to things in the phenomenal world. So the
noumenal agent must be outside time. Yet the sensible world is
always in time. So the agent outside time must be having an effect
on things which are in time. The idea of the noumenal agent
outside of time having an effect on events in time carries several
problems with it. First, just how can it "cut in" to the chain of
causal events, since these causal events will always follow uni
versal rules? If I can follow a chain of events backward in time all
the way to my birth and explain everyone of my actions by
pointing to something that happened in the phenomenal world,
then how can I claim that my intelligible character had any choice
in the matter at all?
Since noumena somehow - although we cannot know how
- underlie phenomena, one wa y to explain this is to take the posi tion
that our intelligible character creates a complete causal history that
enables us to make the decisions that we make in our lives (Wood 91
92).

Let's consider a woman named Jennifer for example. Jennifer
makes a moral decision which involves donating a sum of money to
an organization which fights against racism. Now, insofar as she is
intelligible, }em1ifer made this decision freely. However/ insofar as
she is sensible, we must be able to explain her action causally. So we
discover that Jennifer is very tolerant of other races and very much
against racism. We can explain this causally/ too: Jennifer was raised
by her parents to be very tolerant. J€lmifer' s parents raised her that
way because they were strongly affected by the Holocaust.
Now/ since we can explain Jennifer's decision completely
through causation in the sensible world/ how can we explain the
connection that her intelligible freedom has to her decision? One
way is to say that her noumenal aspect ordered the phenomenal
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world in such a way that allowed her to make the decisions which she
made. She created a world in which she was able to have the beliefs
she had and perform the actions she performed according to the laws
of causation.
The trouble with this is readily apparent. The Holocaust
seems to be an essential part ofthe causal history leading to Jennifer's
decision. Does that mean that Jennifer created the Holocaust, and is
responsible for it?
Critics of Kant contend just that, and say this model has
disastrous consequences. Jonathan Bennett holds that in this way we
could possibly be responsible for such things as the Holocaust,
although we don't realize it, because our noumenal aspects made a
choice about our life which has the Holocaust as an indIrect but
necessary causal condition. If true, this would undermine Kant's
theory considerably,

he is trying to construct a model in which

we could think of ourselves as being responsible for our own actions.
If we never knew what actions and events we were or were not

responsible for, the theory would he relatively useless.
Since the Holocaust involved the moral choices of other
noumenal agents, who are free and autonomous, it does not seem
possible that they could have been determined by a differentnoumenal
agent in this manner. If I personally were responsible for the
Holocaust, that would mean that the moral decisions of a lot of Nazis
would have been caused by me. But the noumenal agent "begins its
effects in the sensible world," not the intelligible world

B

569). Kant would not allow us to say that we determined the
noumenal choices of other subjects.
It is less clear how Kant could respond to the idea that I

caused, for example, an earthquake due to my noumenal choices.
Let's say this time that Jennifer is a very stingy person and will not
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give money to charity. That's because when Jennifer was growing
up, her family was impoverished and needed to save whatever it
had. Her family's impoverishment was due to an earthquake which
destroyed their home. So, in deciding not to give money to charity,
is Jennifer responsible for the earthquake that allowed the causal
series necessary for her to make that decision? Since it involves a
sensible object that has a noumenal character but no noumenal
agency, it is not contradictory like the Nazi example. However, Kant
still would not want us to be held responsible for destructive forces
of nature. He only wants us to be responsible for our own actions.
This is a problem for Kant, but only so long as we continue to
speculate about how noumena underlie phenomena. But Kant
intended us to do no such speculation. After ali, noumena are things
which are not an object of sensible intuition. Since we have no
intuition other than sensible, we cannot learn of them through
intuition. We are allowed to make certain assumptions about them,
but only when practical reason is at stake. We need to leave the door
open to freedom .in order to permit morality in any reasonable form.
We do not need to know the exact mechanics of that freedom. Our
difficulty comes from asking questions which should not rightly be
asked. Things in themselves are l.mknowablei we can speak nega
tively of them (they are not determined in time), but we should be
wary of saying anything strongly positive about them (they cause
phenomenal events). Kant does assert the latter (Critique B 569), but
in a mild way. We must have some idea that they have effects in the
sensib Ie world, or else the theory o.f freedom is useless, as mentioned
previously. However, we should not even try to map out just how
they accomplish these effects. That would be ont of bounds; we
would be going beyond the practical interest of reason.
One may rightly question the fairness of building a theory on
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a cornerstone that one is not allowed to ask certain questions about.
However, if one accepts the distinction behveen noumena and
phenomena - and I am not in a position to argue for this distinction
in this paper - then one should recognize the validity of what Peter
Suber (in conversation) has called the "shut up!" defense. Kant is
only trying to show that the ideas of free will and natural necessity
are not automatically contradictory: he writes, "What we have been
able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that
... causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature"
(Critique B 586). The question of whether we can be held responsible
for the Holocaust does not disprove Kant's assertion that freedom
and nahl ~al necessity are noncontradictory. It poses a question that
involves the working of noumena, something about which we can
not know.
Wood uses an analogy that I find very appropriate to describe
what Kant is doing (Wood 83). Just as, in our court system, a man is
innocent until proven guilty, free will should be assumed to exist
unless it is proven otherwise. Why should we assume the existence
of

f"~e

will? We have a couple of good reasons. The first, as

mentioned by Wood, is that morality presupposes freedom, and so
maintaining the plaUSibility of freedom is essential for explaining
how we can talk about morality jn rational beings. The second, which
Wood did not mention but which is equally important, is that we are
always assuming that we have freedom. We always act under that
presupposition. It is so integral to our thinking that if we deny it, we
had better have an extremely strong argument for doing so.
As in the courtroom the burden of proof is on the prosecution,
in this case, the burden of proof is on those who would deny free will.
Kant needs only inh'oduce a reasonable doubt (Wood 84). If freedom
contradicted the fact of necessary causation, then we would prob
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ably be justified in denying freedom. However, although there are
things left unaccounted for (and rightfully so, as they are noumenal
issues), Kant shows that we are at least not being contradictory to
assert the existence of both. This lack of contradiction is enough to
introduce the "reasonable doubt."
The noumenal subject as timeless agent brings with it more
problems than just the question of how noumenal events determine
the phenomenaL As Wood points out, since our noumenal aspect is
not in time, as noumenal agents, one might say that we must make
all of our decisions at once - "all in a lump."
This leaves us floundering when we try to account for change
in moral character. Our noumenal decisions are not made through
time; so they must be made all at once (or so the criticism goes).
Noumena are not in time, and thus are unchanging. This makes it
puzzling to consider how some people start out as decent people and
end up becoming immoral, or how some people are crooked but
through some effort manage to better themselves. Somehow, such
people mllst make a nOll menal choice to be strangely morally incon
sistent, and that is difficult to understand.
Closely related to tha t is the idea tha tit is useless for one to try
to improve himself (Wood 97). All our choices are presumably made
in a lump, so the idea of striving to become a better person over time

seems worthless. But I believe Kant would have wanted people to try
to become more Illoral over time. This seems like a flaw in Kant's
theory.
I bel ieve that these two problems are based on an inaccurate
premise, i.e. if choices are not made through time, then they must be
made "all at once." We cannot talk about things happening "all at
once" in the noumenal world - there is no such thing as coexistence
in the noumenal world. So how do we make our choices in the
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noumenal world, if they are neither through time nor simultaneous?
Well, thatis a dangerous question, as it ventures into territory that we
can't say a whole lot about. The question asks us to discuss some
thing of which we have no conception - timelessness.
Perhaps the most damning is the idea that, since we have
already made all of our noumenal choices, we are not really free
anymore, having been determined already by our own noumenal
choices (Wood 96). The criticism holds that if we could examine all
the factors involved, we could predict with certainty that we would,
e.g., tell a lie on November 2. It implies a rather disturbing fatalism.
Again, my criticism of the all at once" idea stands, because it implies
1/

some sort of phenomenal relation. It doesn't make a lot of sense to
say that one has "already" made noumenal choices since "already"
implies a time relation that does not exist in the noumenal world. But
I have a more specific answer to this position: even if we are
determined in this way, we are determined by our own choices,
which is a sort of freedom - autonomy. If we determine ourselves,
then it means we are not being determined by outside, or heterono
mous, influences.

II

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by

which it is a law to itself [emphasis mine] .. ," (Foundations 440) It's
a rather counterintuitive explanation, since the idea of acting under
rules

even if they are our own rules -. seems to go against the

conception of freedom that some people have, but it still allows for
the core of morality, which is that we are responsible for our own
actions. Even if it were true that at a certain point I could analyze
every relevant cause and discover that at a certain point I would tell
a lie, I don't think that would be grounds to reject Kan.t' s position.

rill

willing to accept that brand of autonomy. Admittedly, it would be
an unpleasant and strange situation if I really did know I was going
to tell a lie on Nov. 2, but fortunately we do not have the ability to take
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into account everything we would need to in order to discover that
outcome. SO, to me, it is irrelevant whether itis theoretically possibIe
or not.
Kant's doctrine of freedom can be difficult to deal with,
particularly the idea of the noumenal, timeless agent. It is an unusual
way of looking at our place in the world, but it still allows us to hold
common-sense beliefs about morality, while it also takes empirical
science into account. The trouble that people run into when criticiz
ing Kant's position is due to their attempting to ask questions about
noumena that should not be asked, and trying to attribute phenom
enal qualities to noumena.
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